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MARKEY

CASE STUDY
Atlantic Yards Community Benefit
Agreement: A Case Study of Organizing
Community Support for Development
NATHAN MARKEY *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Commercial and residential development is occurring at an
explosive rate in Brooklyn at both the Atlantic Center and the
Atlantic Terminal. Now, across the street from these two sites
developers have proposed a 22-acre, $4.9 billion mixed-use
development called Atlantic Yards. 1 Although the Atlantic Yards
project has fostered some support through a Community Benefit
Agreement (CBA), the development has met significant resistance
and opposition remains. 2
This note examines the Atlantic Yards CBA in detail. The
first section shows what a CBA is and how community groups can
induce developers to negotiate. The second section addresses
what makes a good CBA: inclusive processes, effective
negotiation, and that the document is a clear, complete contract.
Next, CBA analysis is introduced showing how the CBA process
affects the substantive, procedural and psychological interests of
the community. 3 The third section evaluates the Atlantic Yards
* J.D., Pace Law School, 2010. I would like to thank my parents, Lowell and
Terry Markey, for their unyielding support and encouragement throughout my
life and academic career.
1. Atlantic Yards Home Page, http://www.atlanticyards.com/ (now renamed
the Barclay’s Center) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). The development will include a
sports event venue, affordable market-rate housing, commercial offices, retail
establishments and a boutique hotel along with eight acres of open space. Id.
2. Numerous community groups have formed coalitions in opposition of the
development demanding that the project be more responsive to the community
as a whole. See, e.g., Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, http://dddb.net/php/lat
estnews_ArchiveDate.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
3. CBA interest analysis can be viewed in terms of substantive,
procedural, and psychological interests.
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CBA, the process used to create it, and how the community’s
interests have been affected.
II. WHAT IS A COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENT?
A CBA is an enforceable contract negotiated by a developer
and a coalition of neighborhood groups. 4 It is designed to aid
community members in shaping a project affecting their lives by
pressing for benefits that meet the community’s needs. 5 CBAs,
are typically negotiated around real estate development, and are
entered into to secure community benefits in exchange for
coalition support during the administrative approval process.
III. SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY BENEFIT
AGREEEMENTS
A CBA must be evaluated in broad terms since provisions for
a successful CBA vary due to individual community circumstances. 6 But any successful CBA must have an inclusive process
Substantive interests relate to the content of the decision, (e.g.: does
the agreement allow for suitable use, is the resource sufficiently
protected, is the community interest protected). Procedural interests
reflect a party’s need to follow the ‘correct procedure.’ For a decision to
be accepted the process used must be perceived as reasonable and fair.
An important component of this fairness is the degree to which the
parties have been involved in the process. Psychological interests
relate to how parties are treated in the process of making a decision. If
a party does not feel adequately involved, treated fairly, and respected
by others, he/she is less likely to support any decision.
Pace University Land Use Law Center, Land Use Leadership Alliance Training
Program: Day 3, 6 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pace Law
School’s Land Use Law Center).
4. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, COMMUNITY
BENEFIT AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 9 (2005),
http://www.communitybenefits.org/downloads/CBA%20Handbook%202005%20fi
nal.pdf; but see BRENDA PARKET, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE BATTLE FOR A
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT IN MILWAUKEE 1 (May 2005), http://www.labor
studies.wayne.edu/power/downloads/Parkeast.pdf (discussing how in 2005, a
CBA supported by twenty-five community groups, was passed by the County
Board in Milwaukee to be the first CBA implemented through legislation).
5. PARKET, supra note 4, at 4.
6. Julian Gross, Community Benefit Agreements: Definitions, Values, And
Legal Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 35, 45 (Fall 2007 /
Winter 2008) (Gross, a leading scholar on CBAs, has created a definition of a
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for forming a community coalition and negotiating agreements,
which will allow stakeholder interests to be addressed including
their substantive, procedural and psychological interests. 7 When
conflict exists, the process most often offends; when a community
feels their voice is not being heard, they believe their procedural
justice and psychological interests were violated. 8 The CBA
negotiating process needs to be well organized and transparent to
be effective, with operating rules laid out prior to negotiation so
that communities can understand the process and feel their
interests are being addressed. Finally, the CBA must be a
complete contract, containing clear, enforceable language, so the
developer understands exactly how to proceed. This includes
remedies in the event of a breach, progress reports, meetings, and
negotiations to ensure all parties’ expectations are met. If
stakeholder interests are addressed, a CBA will ensure
community interests are protected.
A. The Process is Inclusive
A planning process that ignores public opinion results in
controversy regardless of any public benefit. However, when
public input is allowed, the result is often well received, if not
beneficial. 9 A CBA negotiation process “provides a mechanism to
CBA from four elements: 1) “A CBA concerns a single development project;” 2)
“A CBA is [a] legally enforceable contract;” 3) “A CBA addresses a range of
community interests;” and 4) “A CBA is the product of substantial community
involvement”).
7. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at
Days 1-2.
8. KIRK EMERSON ET AL., THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 6-9 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa Bingham eds., 2003);
‘Procedural Justice’ offers a theory of procedural fairness for civil
dispute resolution. The core idea behind the theory is the procedural
legitimacy thesis: participation rights are essential for the legitimacy
of adjudicatory procedures. The theory yields two principles of
procedural justice: the accuracy principle and the participation
principle. The two principles require a system of procedure to aim at
accuracy and to afford reasonable rights of participation qualified by a
practicability constraint.
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, Abstract
(2004).
9. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at
Day 2.
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ensure that community concerns are heard and addressed.”10
Community inclusiveness in the development process makes
CBAs successful. 11
When benefits are negotiated in an inclusive CBA, it
promotes a sense of procedural justice to the community, 12 which
implies that citizen satisfaction with a resolution process is
directly related to their opportunities to participate. When
citizens feel they are part of procedural justice, the perceived
legitimacy of decisions and outcomes increase, thereby decreasing
the probability of objection 13 and minimizing opposition to
discretionary approval from government entities. This stands in
contrast to situations where stakeholders feel a decision was
forced upon them without the opportunity to be heard. 14
Exclusion from the process makes parties feel the decision may be
unreasonable, or that they were treated unfairly. 15 When
stakeholders do not feel procedural justice, they oppose the
decision. 16
B. Effective Community Benefit Agreement
Negotiation
The first step in pursuing CBA negotiations is to organize a
broad based coalition of stakeholders with diverse community
interests, who can formalize their relationship by creating a
Community Benefits Coalition (CBC). 17 This will give the CBA
an inclusive character and a degree of democratic legitimacy

10. GROSS, LEROY & JANIS-APARACIO, supra note 4, at 21.
11. Greg LeRoy & Anna Puriton, NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP, COMM UNITY B ENEFITS A GREEMENTS : E NSURING T HAT U RBAN R EDEVELOPMENT
BENEFITS EVERYONE 3-4 (2005), http://www.nfg.org/publications/community_
benefits_agreements.pdf.
12. GROSS, LEROY & JANIS-APARACIO, supra note 4, at 21; Land Use
Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at Day 2.
13. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
14. Id. (citing AMY J. DOUGLAS, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION
(1987)); Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at Days
1-2.
15. Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at Day 3.
16. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
17. David A. Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements: New Vehicle for
Investment in America’s Neighborhoods, 39 URB. LAW. 657, 663-64 (2007).
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compared to typical bi-lateral negotiations between developers
and government. 18
The CBC members should draft a Coalition Operating
Agreement to establish procedures limiting the negotiation with
the developer in order to guard against individuals attempting to
directly benefit from the negotiation. 19 Throughout the process
the CBC should court uninvolved community organizations to
increase political clout and influence elected officials. 20
Additionally, the CBC should only negotiate benefits that relate
to the impact of the proposed project. Incorporating unrelated
benefits corrupts the zoning review process and taints public
perception. 21
The process of negotiating a CBA should be transparent, so
the entire community can understand the developer’s specific
commitments and monitor the development project’s outcome. 22
The Coalition must represent the views of the community as a
whole to ensure an inclusive public process. If stakeholders are
excluded from knowledge about a process, it may be perceived as
unreasonable and unfair when that same process later affects
them. 23

18. Id. at 664.
19. See Memorandum from David Marcello, The Public Law Center, A
“Concentric Circles” Model For Organizing Community Benefit Agreements (Mar.
15, 2007), available at http://www.law.tulane.edu/WorkArea/downloadasse
t.aspx?id=5746&LangType=1033 (executable pdf) (discussing of the role of the
CBC, along with the steps and procedures that that a CBC should take for
negotiations to be effective upon reaching the negotiating table). For a model
Operating Agreement see Tulane University Law School, The Public Law
Center, Services to the Community, http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlscenters/Public
LawCenter/home.aspx?id =3906 (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
20. See id.
21. In an influential 1988 report, the New York City Bar Association said
some politicians had approved projects solely to get unrelated benefits, thereby
corrupting the zoning process. The lawyers’ group recommended that any amenities promised by a developer have a reasonable relationship to the project, a
practice that successive administrations adopted said Jesse Masyr, the lawyer
who negotiated the Bronx Terminal agreement. See Terry Pristin, In Major
Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/realestate/commercial /14agree.html.
22. GROSS, LEROY & JANIS-APARACIO, supra note 4, at 22.
23. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at
Days 1-2.
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C. The Agreement is Clear and Complete
CBAs are contracts and must meet the basic elements of a
contract to be an effective tool. Opponents of CBAs often criticize
them for lapses in enforceability, not providing adequate modes of
revision or negotiation, a lack of consideration by the community
coalition, or clear outcomes to the contract. 24 Enforceability is
critical if a CBA is to be an effective tool for providing benefits to
the community. The CBA must provide clear terms describing
provisions for enforcement, remedies available to the parties, as
well as the forum in which parties may seek enforcement. Since
a community coalition could dissolve and render the CBA
unenforceable, incorporating the government is essential to
ensuring that provisions can be imposed in perpetuity. 25
Often, when the government negotiates a Development
Agreement for community benefits, the agreements are couched
in vague terms with non-binding goals and aspirations, as
opposed to “enforceable language used on traditional land use
issues like project design, infrastructure . . . and financing
requirements.” 26 The CBA should use legally binding terms,
thereby assuring that all parties will be accountable for the
provisions in the agreement.
A complete CBA should provide adequate modes for review
and revision. Most major development projects require continuing oversight since the project will immediately impact the
24. Patricia E. Salkin, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements: Opportunities And Traps For Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, American Law Institute—American Bar Association for Continuing Legal
Education, Course of Study, SN005 ALI-ABA 1407, 1424-26 (Aug. 16-18, 2007).
The author notes that the “enforceability of CBAs has yet to be tested in court,
but that some lawyers have expressed concerns that the agreements will not
hold up.” Id. at 1424. The primary concern has been whether community groups
provide any consideration for these contracts; however promises to not oppose
developments are likely to be deemed supported by consideration. 17 AM. J UR.
2D Contracts § 124 (1964). In contract law, only signatories are able to enforce
provisions; CBAs have been encouraged to require that each community group
sign the CBA separately. Salkin, at 1424. For a more in-depth discussion of legal
issues related to CBA, see Salkin, at 1424-26.
25. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits
Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and Other Considerations for
Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 291, 295 (2008).
26. Gross, supra note 6, at 39.
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community while benefits may not be realized for years to come.
To avoid this, CBAs should include provisions for continued
review and monitoring of developers’ progress. Further, while
negotiations should attempt to capture all of the parties’
concerns, as the development progresses, the terms may need to
be modified to accommodate all parties. So, the CBA should have
flexible provisions allowing for negotiation and change.
IV. ATLANTIC YARDS
Atlantic Yards will be a multi-purpose development project
that will collect over $300 million in subsidies from New York
City and State, and will receive property and sales tax
Some have
exemptions along with property transfers. 27
estimated that the project will receive $2,157,260,000 in subsidies
and tax breaks. 28 This fiscal promise provides community groups
with substantial leverage in negotiating benefits in exchange for
support during the approval process.
A. Atlantic Yards CBA
Developer Bruce Ratner announced his intention to build the
Atlantic Yards Arena on December 10, 2003. 29 However, not
until January 23, 2004 did it become certain that the Atlantic
Yards project would move forward. 30 Then, in July 2004, the
developer held a meeting of potential CBA signatories 31
including: the New York Chapter for the Association of
27. Charles V. Bagli, Brooklyn Arena Builder Plans to Break Ground In
December After Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2008/09/10/nyregion/10yards.html.
28. Calder, Rich, Your ‘Net’ Loss: $2B In Taxes to Ratner, NEW YORK POST
(Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/your_net_
loss_Qz1qBFFuTuAysV3Be1rEOJ.
29. Charles V. Bagli, A Grand Plan in Brooklyn For the Nets’ Arena Complex,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
12/11/nyregion/a-grand-plan-in-brooklyn-for-the-nets-arena-complex.html.
30. Richard Sandomir & Charles V. Bagli, Ratner’s Path to Buy Nets Had
Pitfalls and Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2004/01/25/sports/pro-basketball-ratner-s-path-to-buy-nets-had-pitfallsandpromise.html.
31. PRATT INST. CTR. FOR COMMUNITY & ENVTL. DEV., SLAM DUNK OR AIRBALL?
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ATLANTIC YARDS PROJECT 14 (2005).
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Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a
membership-based group representing low-income city residents;
Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), a
local group sponsored by Assembly member Roger Green; and the
Downtown Brooklyn Oversight and Advisory Committee
(DBOAC), which focuses on contracts for minorities and women. 32
The final CBA was signed June 27, 2005, resulting in seven
distinct agreed upon categories of benefits 33 including: Jobs
Development; Small Business Development and Contracting,
Housing; Community Amenities and Facilities; Environmental
Assurances; and Public Housing, and Educational Initiatives.
These seven areas encompass a broad range of values and
benefits for the community beyond those typically provided
without a CBA. Despite this, the development still faces large
opposition.
B. Atlantic Yards CBA Process
i. Is the Process Inclusive?
Early on it was apparent that the developer desired a CBA to
gain public support. 34 BUILD moved to negotiate a CBA,
presenting a draft on April 24, 2004, three months after it was
certain the project was moving forward. 35 Madeline JanisAparicio, executive director of the Los Angeles Alliance for a New
Economy, stated it should take up to a year to bring together a
coalition before beginning negotiations, and that successful CBAs
32. See id.
33. See Atlantic Yards Community Benefit Agreement (June 2005) (on file
with author); See also Atlantic Yards, The Community Benefits Agreement at a
Glance, (2005) (on file with author) (providing a brief summation of the major
points of each community benefit area negotiated).
34. See Bettina Damiani, Comments at the Public Hearing of the New York
City Council Committee on Economic Development on the Proposed Atlantic
Yards Project (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.goodjobsny.org/testim
ony_bay_5_05.htm. Bettina Damiani, Project Director at Good Jobs New York,
which promotes accountability in the use of economic development subsidies,
states that this is “the first project [Good Jobs New York] know[s] of in New
York City in which the developer has advertised that he seeks to participate in a
[CBA].” Id.
35. Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD), Facts &
Myths, http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/index.php?sect_id=fact (last visited Oct.
26, 2009).
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don’t skip steps and still form broad, complete community
coalitions. 36
Here, a single entity attempted to negotiate a CBA without
taking the time required to create a representative coalition.
Bettina Damiani, project director of Good Job New York, stated
that the most striking difference between the proposed Atlantic
Yards CBA and the CBAs in California is that the Atlantic Yards
CBA lacked a broad coalition representing varied interests. In
the Atlantic Yards CBA a few groups—all already publicly
supporting the project—pursued individual concerns rather than
including the community as a whole in a comprehensive
negotiation. 37 “While certainly a win in the fight for affordable
housing,” the chance for an inclusive coalition, representing all
parties, was reduced. 38
Damiani stated that CBAs normally include a broad coalition
representing a variety of interests that might oppose a project. 39
As described by Damiani typically “the coalition hammers out its
points of unity in advance,” 40 in a Coalition Operating
Agreement. Then, during negotiations, individual group issues
proceed as unmet until all member issues are addressed. 41 This
way the bargaining power of each benefits the coalition as a
whole.
The groups that signed the Atlantic Yards CBA did not form
a broad coalition representing the entire community. 42 By
36. Terry Pristin, In Major Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/realestate/comer
cial/14agree.html?pagewanted=1.
37. See Damiani, supra note 34. It should be noted, counter to many statements by opposition parties, that when the negotiations took place, all parties
met together, according to BUILD President James Caldwell in a phone
interview.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. See also Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements, supra, note 17, at
663-64; Marcello, “Concentric Circles,” supra note 19.
42. The President of BUILD stated during a phone interview that other
community groups were invited to the negotiations by the President of
Brooklyn’s Office prior to the beginning of the negotiations who turned down the
invitations, but neither Mr. Caldwell nor the President’s Office were able to
name any parties invited nor provide documentation of the invitations to the
other groups. It should be noted that eventually, two months into negotiations,
another group was invited to join the negotiations by the developer only after

9

MARKEY

386

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

excluding others from negotiation, the signatories defeated the
fundamental purpose of the CBA—to garner public support.
Instead, an alternative coalition was formed including three
elected officials from the project’s proposed location. 43 While also
supporting development, this coalition had different goals than
the CBA signatories. By being left out of the process, this group’s
sense of procedural justice was breached, creating strong
opposition to the development, in spite of the beneficial provisions
negotiated by the signatories. 44
Opposition to the Agreement stated that the public was
unaware of negotiations until the story broke on October 2, 2004,
two months after negotiation started and an analyst from Good
Jobs New York expressed concern over the lack of transparency. 45
Prior to the newspaper article, the negotiators made no public
drawing attention to itself. However this invitation was eventually turned down.
See Jess Wisloski, Ratner invites chosen few to draft agreement, THE BROOKLYN
PAPER, Oct. 2, 2004, available at http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/38/
27_38nets2.html; Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD),
Facts & Myths, http://www.buildbrooklyn.org/index.php?sect_id=fact (last
visited Oct. 26, 2009); but see Brian J. Carreira, Ratner Applies Full-Court Press
on Downtown Arena, THE BROOKLYN RAIL, Nov. 2004, available at
http://www.brooklynrail.org/%202004/11/local/ratner-applies-full-court-press-onthe-d (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). Discussing how,
[a]t the October 26 BUILD meeting in Crown Heights, however, there
was a distinctly different interpretation of both the overall proposal as
well as the CBA negotiations. Marie Louis, the 1st Vice President of the
group, described the PICCED survey as ‘skewed’ and said that the
assertion that local residents weren’t being engaged in the CBA process
is ‘laughable.’
Id.
43. Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, Community Based Plans, Community
Design Principles, http://dddb.net/php/community/principles.php (last visited
Oct. 26, 2009). The alternative coalition has created an agreement of values and
benefits that they would negotiate for together, as recommended by both
Damiani and Marcello. Additionally, the alternative coalition has created a
development and found the support of a developer, Extell, who eventually bid
more for the Vanderbilt Yards property than Ratner, but MTA choose to go with
the lower bid. See also Develop—Don’t Destroy Brooklyn, Community Based
Plans, The UNITY Community Development Plan, http://dddb.net/php/commun
ity/unity.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
44. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at
Day 1, 2.
45. Jess Wisloski, Who will benefit from arena CBA, THE BROOKLYN PAPER,
Oct. 16, 2004, available at http://brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/40/27_40nets4.
html.
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statements.
A Community Board district manager stated
“[o]ngoing negotiations are not something typically done in the
public forum,” against typical principles of a successful CBA. 46
While BUILD President, James Caldwell, stated that the
meetings were open to the public, and that BUILD held weekly
meetings to inform its own members about Atlantic Yards and
the CBA process, 47 the public felt the process was hidden. 48
Nearly a full year after the CBA was signed, on June 13, 2006,
the coalition began to hold “meet & greet” sessions, open forums
for the coalition to inform the community about the benefits of
the Agreement. 49 While these meetings represented a step
toward increasing transparency in the CBA process, it came too
late. With the document already signed, the community had
already been left out.
ii. Benefits Not Reflective of Community Needs and
Concerns
Besides the exclusionary, opaque process, community
stakeholders are often concerned that, while the CBA provisions
are beneficial, they do not address the actual concerns of the
community. 50 The Pratt Institute conducted a survey of residents
and businesses in the vicinity of the Atlantic Yards and found
they have major concerns about housing, traffic, and the project’s
potential impact on neighborhood schools and public safety. 51
For the many residents who are not directly facing these issues,
the promise of jobs and affordable housing outweighs the
neighbor-hood concerns of those residents of Prospect Heights
and downtown Brooklyn. 52 The Pratt survey found that residents
46. Wisloski, supra note 42.
47. Telephone Interview with James Caldwell, President, BUILD (Feb. 6,
2009); see also Carreira, supra note 42.
48. See, e.g., Wisloski, supra note 42.
49. Posting of Norman Oder, CBA coalition launches invite-only “Meet &
Greet” session, to Atlantic Yards Report Watchdog Blog (June 23, 2006, 7:27
AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2006/06/cba-coalition-launchesinvit
e-only.html.
50. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 56.
51. Id. at 2, 24. The survey was of some 20,000 people near downtown
Brooklyn, between June and September 2004, about six to nine months after the
announcement of the project. Id. at 24.
52. Id. at 24.
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support development in the neighborhood, but they want future
development to address neighborhood shortcomings and provide
opportunity for the low-income populations in Brooklyn. 53
The CBA negotiated between the developer and the limited
community groups addresses most of the primary concerns found
by Pratt in its survey of local residents, except for traffic safety
and street conditions, which were marginally addressed during
the environmental review process. 54 Section IV of the CBA is
named “Workforce Development” and “its purpose is to
implement workforce development initiatives addressing the
problem of disproportionately high unemployment within the
Community.” 55 The CBA includes provisions for hiring and
training community minorities for skilled jobs while also helping
The CBA addresses
local small business development. 56
affordable housing, housing for senior citizens, and makes
provisions for displaced families by providing leases in the new
buildings at the same cost as their prior residences. 57
Community concern over the lack of quality educational facilities,
were also addressed, with the promise of adding four schools with
specific curricular concentrations and after school programs. 58 In
addition, the CBA addresses other concerns such as the need for
an affordable health care center, childcare centers, community
youth and senior centers, as well as environmental assurances,
and open space. 59 Issues not significantly focused on include
traffic and parking issues, eminent domain, displacement of
residents and businesses, increased real estate prices, impact on
public transportation, and the effect that the scale of the
development will have on the community character. 60 While the
CBA does address numerous community concerns, these
unanswered issues demonstrate the necessity for a broader

53. Id.
54. See Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33; PRATT
INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24.
55. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33, at 11.
56. Id. at 11-22, 37; see also The Community Benefits Agreement at a Glance,
supra note 33, at 1.
57. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33, at 22–25.
58. Id. at 38-41.
59. See generally id.
60. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24.
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coalition that will ensure that more of the community’s concerns
are heard.
iii. Atlantic Yards CBA is Clear and Complete
As stated, a CBA is a contract and must meet the elements of
a contract.
It must provide the proper mechanisms for
community groups to enforce its provisions and provide clear
terms as to how the provisions will be enforced. The Atlantic
Yards CBA has clear terms throughout the agreement and
finalizes those terms with an enforcement section for when the
parties need to mediate disagreements. 61
Some opponents criticize the enforcement provisions of the
Agreement as being too lax, since it opts for arbitration and
But
mediation before monetary penalties or litigation. 62
opponents forget that a CBA is used to collaborate toward a
beneficial outcome for all, and that enforcement provisions that
advocate continued harmony rather than an adversarial attitude
reflect a well thought out Agreement. Some CBAs, including the
California Models, have similarly vague enforcement sections, 63
reinforcing the idea that encouraging collaboration is one sign of
a thorough CBA. Additionally, mediation and arbitration allow
for modification and change during the development process—a
key feature as large developments often take years and have
unforeseeable impacts. Allowing space for both parties to modify
provisions of the agreement as circumstances change is sound
reasoning. 64 The Atlantic Yards CBA provisions allowing
modification, change and collaboration to solve disputes are signs
of a successful CBA negotiation; a document that will allow
continued collaboration toward a mutually beneficial end under
any circumstance.
While not a requirement of a successful CBA, having the
government serve as a signatory of the agreement ensures
enforceability of the provisions if the community groups dissolve.
61. Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33, at 46.
62. Posting of Norman Oder, “Substantial legally enforceable penalties?”
FCR’s claims about CBA raise doubts, to Atlantic Yards Report Watchdog Blog
(Feb. 19, 2008, 6:04 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2008/02/subst
antial-legally-enforceable. html.
63. Id.
64. See generally id.
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This is particularly helpful in a CBA of this nature where there
are limited community groups and provisions that may be
enforced by only one side.
C. Analysis
The Atlantic Yards CBA illustrates how, when parties feel
they are denied procedural justice, their perception of a decision
or an outcome’s legitimacy will decrease; which will subsequently
increases the probability that the community will object to that
same decision or outcome during the approval process. 65 Many
community residents felt the CBA’s formation and negotiation
processes were neither reasonable nor correct, that participants
were not treated fairly, and that the process infringed upon the
communities’ procedural and psychological interests. 66 While the
CBA does provides numerous benefits, including affordable
housing and union jobs, the coalition failed to address other
community concerns such as traffic, parking, and the forced relocation of residents. 67 The process that was used violated the
community’s three categories of interests, and instead fueled
parties’ opposition to the development.
In addition, the coalition abandoned the California CBA
model and rejected much of the academic literature. 68 Instead of
acting in unison, the group employed a piecemeal approach
driven by individual demands and used a memorandum of
understanding that led to the final document. 69 As an alternative, the group should have recruited from the general public to
form a representational, or broader community base rather than
letting the developer individually approach specific stakeholders
and negotiate the agreement behind closed doors. Had an
alternative process been used it could have created an inclusive
65. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8; see generally Develop—Don’t Destroy
Brooklyn, The Opposition, http://dddb.net/php/opposition.php (last visited Oct.
26, 2009).
66. See Damiani, supra note 34; Land Use Leadership Alliance Training
Program, supra note 3, at Days 1-2.
67. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24.
68. See LeRoy & Puriton, supra note 11, at 6-9; Marcello, Community Benefit
Agreements, supra note 17, at 663-64.
69. Atlantic Yards Related Documents, Atlantic Yards, http://www.atlantic
yards.com/html/footer/documents.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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process, increasing the publicly perceived legitimacy of process. 70
Additionally, the coalition should have composed an Operating
Agreement limiting parties from negotiating individually, thereby
creating greater unity.
When released to the public, an
Operating Agreement would have increased transparency and
informed the community about the goals and purposes of the
negotiations. 71
While the process that created the CBA was flawed, the final
document itself was clear and complete, allowing for ongoing
negotiations, modifications, and/or collaborations between the
parties. The Atlantic Yards CBA provides numerous benefits,
such as affordable housing, open space, union jobs, and
environmental assurances, reflecting residents’ concerns and
needs. 72 However, these benefits were tainted in the public’s eye
due to a lack of transparency.
V. CONCLUSION
The Atlantic Yards CBA provides many helpful provisions
that advance community interests. As a document, it provides for
review and revision as the development progresses, and includes
provisions so that community groups can enforce their respective
conditions. However, the exclusive process negated broader
community involvement and created a palpable sense of
procedural injustice. 73
Large developments change the landscape of any given
community, even one as developed and urbanized as Brooklyn.
They impact daily life both positively by providing new resources
and assets, and negatively by further burdening public
infrastructure, including schools and roads. These potential
impacts of large develop projects typically result in a polarized
debate, much like the Atlantic Yards controversy. However,
where developers employ an inclusive CBA process that allows

70. See Marcello, Community Benefit Agreements, supra note 17, at 663-64.
71. See Marcello, “Concentric Circles,” supra note 19.
72. See Atlantic Yards, Community Benefit Agreement, supra note 33.
73. PRATT INST. CTR., supra note 31, at 24 (stating that “an overwhelming
majority (81.4%) of survey respondents said they were either very concerned or
concerned about the impact of the proposed Brooklyn Atlantic Yards Project”).
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broad community involvement, it can dissipate much of the
neighborhood opposition.
When a CBA process is inclusive it allows for a sense of
procedural justice and creates a process that can address the
interests of the community. 74 When a stakeholder is given the
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, his or
her procedural interests are met, 75 and a sense of inclusion
satisfies the community’s psychological interests. 76 Intuitively,
when a party is given an opportunity to be heard, it is more likely
that the process will address their substantive interests. 77 When
a person’s procedural interests are satisfied and he or she is given
a sense of procedural justice, the probability that the citizen will
object to the development during the approval process is
decreased. 78 In summation, when a person’s three interests,
procedural, psychological and substantive are addressed, it will
likely decrease the conflict surrounding a development. Even in
situations where the ultimate decision may go against the
stakeholder’s substantive interest, if that person’s procedural
interest is met, he or she may feel that the ultimate goal was still
achieved—the community interest was protected by its
involvement in an inclusive CBA.
The Atlantic Yards CBA provides for numerous potential
benefits that would not otherwise be provided to the community
from a typical development. However, the process in which the
coalition was formed and operated lacked the necessary
transparency to create an inclusive group and to give the public
assurances that their concerns about the development and the
needs of the community were being addressed by the coalition.
Future CBA coalitions can look to the Atlantic Yards as a model
for potential benefits and how to draft a clear and complete
contract, but should avoid the many early pitfalls of failing to
create an inclusive CBA. The potential Columbia CBA in
Manhattan is already taking note to avoid the errors of the

74. See Land Use Leadership Alliance Training Program, supra note 3, at
Days 1-2.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. EMERSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
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Atlantic Yards CBA by seeking a wider coalition and allow
greater public review of the process. 79

79. Posting of Norman Order, CBAs head to head: Columbia vs. Atlantic
Yards, Atlantic Yards Report Watchdog Blog (Aug. 22, 2007, 6:25 AM),
http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2007/08/cbas-head-to-head-columbia-vsatlantic.html.
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